CONFERENCE OF THE COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

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FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE FOUR HUNDRED AND FIFTY-SEVENTH MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 12 March 1970, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman: Mr. R.E. SARAIVA GUERREIRO (Brazil)

(Previous verbatim records in this series appeared under the symbols ENDC/PV.1-ENDC/PV.430).

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PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Argentina:	Mr. C. ORTIZ de ROZAS
	Mr. A.F. DUMONT
	Mr. V.E. BERASATEGUI
Brazil:	Mr. R.E. SARAIVA GUERREIRO
	Mr. L.F. PALMEIRA LAMPREIA
Bulgaria:	Mr. K. CHRISTOV
	Mr. D. STAMBOLIEV
	Mr. I. PEINIRDJIEV
Burma:	U MAUNG MAUNG GYI
Canada:	Mr. G. IGNATIEFF
	Mr. R.W. CLARK
	Mr. J.R. MORDEN
Czechoslovakia:	Mr. T. LAHODA
	Mr. J. STRUCKA
	Mr. J. CINGROS
Ethiopia:	Mr. A. ZELLEKE
Hungary:	Mr. I. KOMIVES
	Mr. J. PETRAN
	Mr. I. SARKADI
India:	Mr. M.A. HUSAIN
	Mr. N. KRISHNAN
	Mr. K.P. JAIN
Italy:	Mr. R. CARACCIOLO
	Mr. F.L. OTTIERI
	Mr. R. BORSARELLI
	Mr. U. PESTALOZZA

Japan:	Mr. I. ABE
	Mr. H. OTSUKA
	Mr. Y. TSUZUKI
	Mr. J. SAKAMOTO
Mexico:	Mr. M. TELLO
Mongolia:	Mr. M. DUGERSUREN
	Mr. D. ERDEMBILEG
	Mr. Z. ERENDO
Morocco:	Mr. N. EL FASSI
	Mr. M.A.A. KHATTABI
Netherlands:	Mr. H.F. ESCHAUZIER
	Mr. E. BOS
Nigeria:	Alhaji SULE KOLO
	Mr. C.O. HOLLIST
	Mr. L.A. MALIKI
Pakistan:	Mr. K. AHMED
	Mr. T.O. HYDER
Poland:	Mr. K. ZYBYLSKI
	Mr. H. STEPOSZ
	Mr. R. WLAZLO
Romania:	Mr. I. DATCU
	Mr. O. IONESCO
	Mr. V. PARASCHIV
	Mr. C. GEORGESCO
Sweden:	Mrs. A. MYRDAL
	Mr. A. EDELSTAM
	Mr. I. VIRGIN
	Mr. R. BOMAN

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:	Mr. A.A. ROSHCHIN
	Mr. V.V. SHOUSTOV
	Mr. L.A. MASTERKOV
	Mr. V.B. TOULINOV
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	Mr. E.S. EL REEDY
	Mr. M. ISMAIL
United Kingdom:	Lord CHALFONT
	Mr. I.F. PORTER
	Mr. W.N. HILLIER-FRY
	Mr. J.T. MASEFIELD
United States of America:	Mr. J.F. LEONARD
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	Mr. W. GIVAN
	Mr. R.L. McCORMACK
Yugoslavia:	Mr. M. BOZINOVIC
	Mr. M. VUKOVIC
Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General:	Mr. W. EPSTEIN

1. The CHAIRMAN (Brazil): I declare open the 457th plenary meeting of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament.

2. Before I call on the first speaker, permit me to draw the attention of the Committee to document CCD/282, which contains the statement of the Secretary-General on the occasion of the entry into force of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (ENDC/226*) on 5 March 1970.

3. Mr. HUSAIN (India): As I am taking the floor for the first time this session, I should like to take the opportunity to welcome our new colleagues -- the representative of Brazil, Ambassador Guerreiro; the representative of Japan, Ambassador Abe; the representative of Poland, Ambassador Natorf; and the representative of Romania, Ambassador Datcu.

4. This session, beginning as it does on the threshold of the 1970s, is as it were the inauguration of the Disarmament Decade declared by the United Nations General Assembly last year. The wise words addressed to us by our Secretary-General, U Thant, (CCD/PV.450), who considered it important to visit us, not only underline the significance of this fact but should also serve as a reminder to us of how much of our task still remains to be accomplished. In accordance with General Assembly resolution 2602 E (XXIV) this Committee, while continuing its intensive work on negotiating agreements on collateral measures, is required --

> "...to work out at the same time a comprehensive programme, dealing with all aspects of the problem of the cessation of the arms race and general and complete disarmament under effective international control ..." (CCD/275).

Furthermore, this "comprehensive programme" should "provide the Conference with a guideline to chart the course of its further work and its negotiations." (ibid.)

5. Judging from the rather disappointing experience we have had with the Decade decreed by the international community in the sphere of economic development, we are convinced that a mere declaration of intent would be meaningless unless it were reinforced by an agreed programme for concrete action. Our broad objectives have been stated time and again in various General Assembly resolutions and declarations.

(Mr. Husain, India)

It would seem, therefore, to my delegation that if we in this Committee, which we keep reminding ourselves and others is the world's principal forum for multilateral negotiations on arms control and disarmament, are to inaugurate the Disarmament Decade meaningfully and seriously, then our first essential task is to draw up -- providing, of course, for a degree of flexibility -- some order of priorities for what we are going to concentrate on until the next session of the General Assembly and in the subsequent years of the Disarmament Decade, maintaining, as suggested by the representative of Italy on 26 February, a balance between measures of disarmament and collateral measures (CCD/PV.453, para.8).

6. The Secretary-General, in his address to us on 18 February, observed that --

> "Elements of such a programme already exist in the two drafts of treaties for general and complete disarmament presented in 1962 by the Soviet Union (ENDC/2/Rev.1) and the United States (ENDC/30 and Add.1-3), in the provisional agenda (ENDC/236, p.3) adopted by the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament in August 1968, and in resolution C adopted by the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States in September 1968 (A/7277, pp.6, 7)." (CCD/PV.450, para.20)

But, as pointed out by the delegation of the United Arab Republic on 24 February, the programme should "not be a mere list of items pertaining to the cessation of the armaments race, disarmament or merely non-armament juxtaposed without sequence or interrelation". (CCD/PV.452, para.38) The Indian delegation is in full agreement with this view, and has repeatedly during the last two years urged the need for some order of priorities indicative of the political will to reach agreement, which alone could ensure an improved organization or better mechanics of work and higher output, the need for which has been stressed by a large number of delegations.

7. It would, I think, be more appropriate if in this Disarmament Decade we spent less time on recalling again and again the achievement in past decades of some non-armament measures -- principally the non-proliferation Treaty -- and instead began to consider seriously actual arms limitation and disarmament measures. Only then would the goal of general and complete disarmament look like a possibility attainable within the foreseeable future.

(Mr. Husain, India)

8. While speaking of the Disarmament Decade, let me add that we have been reminded in the same General Assembly resolution once again that the ultimate goal is general and complete disarmament. The Indian delegation suggested in this Committee in 1968 (ENDC/PV.389, para.7) that progress in this regard would be facilitated if the United States and the Soviet Union were to submit, in the light of various suggestions which had been made and the many developments which had since taken place, revised versions of their draft treaties presented in 1962 (ENDC/30 and Add.1-3; ENDC/2/Rev.1). Many other delegations have since expressed a similar view in order that the Committee may have, in the words used in the Mexican working papers, "a realistic and effective basis for the work entrusted to it" (CCD/277, para.6). While this has so far not been done, we have however noted with great interest Mr. Roshchin's opening statement on 17 February, wherein he said that --

> "...the Soviet delegation deems it most necessary that the Committee should take up again the detailed consideration of the draft treaties on general and complete disarmament which have already been submitted, and that it should endeavour to work out an agreed text." (CCD/PV.449, para.56)

We hope, therefore, that some progress can be made on the lines suggested by us before the next session of the General Assembly.

9. This would seem imperative, as has already been stressed by several delegations, because world military expenditure has sharply increased from $120,000 million in 1962 to $200,000 million in 1969. The Secretary-General, in his address to this Committee on 18 February, observed that --

> "This unproductive and wasteful diversion of the world's resources and energy exacted a heavy toll on the living conditions of the peoples of the world in both the developing and the developed countries." (CCD/PV.450, para.10)

In this connexion it may be pointed out that the SIPRI Year Book of World Armaments and Disarmament 1968/69 (p.29) has drawn attention to the fact that the United States and the Soviet Union accounted for some 70 per cent of world military expenditure in 1968, and between them accounted for 80 per cent of the rise in world military expenditures between 1965 and 1968. So it would seem more than ever necessary that, in order to curtail world military expenditure, our first priority should be measures in the field of nuclear disarmament.

(Mr. Husain, India)

10. There is another important aspect of the problem of general and complete disarmament which has been raised and which deserves our earnest consideration. Mr. Roshchin, in his statement on 17 February, said that --

> "In asserting the need to proceed to the elaboration of a treaty on general and complete disarmament, we should like to stress that such a treaty can be concluded only with the participation of the maximum number of militarily-important States, and in the first place of all the nuclear Powers." (CCD/PV.449, para.58)

The Secretary-General, in his statement on 18 February, also said that --

> "...serious attempts should be made to obtain the participation of all the nuclear Powers in all efforts for disarmament. The active co-operation of all of them is essential for a full measure of success." (CCD/PV.450, para.24)

11. We agree with these observations, and would be interested to know what steps have been taken or are proposed to associate France and the People's Republic of China with nuclear and other disarmament talks. Unless some steps are taken towards this end, the present stalemate on various important disarmament questions will continue, as also, for a greater part of the world, the unreality of some of the agreements on measures of non-armament that we take pride in having concluded. The challenge of the Disarmament Decade calls for a proper perspective, appropriate priorities and urgent action in this regard.

12. In its resolution 2602 A (XXIV), which my delegation co-sponsored, the General Assembly expressed the hope that bilateral negotiations on the limitation of offensive and defensive strategic nuclear-weapon systems would bring about early and positive results which would pave the way for further efforts in the field of nuclear disarmament. In view of "the grave dangers involved in the development of new nuclear weapons through a spiralling nuclear arms race", to which our attention has been drawn by General Assembly resolution 2602 E (XXIV), it is the hope of my delegation that the appeal to the Governments of the USSR and the United States contained in General Assembly resolution 2602 A (XXIV), "to agree, as an urgent preliminary measure, on a moratorium on further testing and deployment of new offensive and defensive strategic nuclear-weapon systems", is receiving the serious consideration of both Governments. In

(Mr. Husain, India)

this connexion let me recall that the Secretary-General, in his address to this Committee on 18 February, said that --

"...if the two parties could agree, pursuant to the appeal of the General Assembly, to a moratorium on the further testing and deployment of new offensive and defensive strategic nuclear-weapon systems, this would be the single most important first step to prevent the escalation of the nuclear arms race." (CCD/PV.450, para.23)

13. The delegation of India has appreciated the effort of the representative of the United States to inform the Committee, to the extent which he found possible, of what transpired at the first round of the bilateral talks held at Helsinki (CCD/PV.449, paras.18-20). We note, however, with some concern that the talks will relate to strategic nuclear arms only and will not cover all nuclear arms; as it would seem that a distinction has been made between nuclear weapons which are strategic and those which are non-strategic. Perhaps in the latter category would fall the so-called tactical or battlefield nuclear weapons. To make such a distinction among nuclear weapons in the context of disarmament negotiations might well turn out to be unfortunate, because all nuclear weapons have basically the same characteristics and are equally dangerous. The world community has over the years called for urgent measures for the cessation of the nuclear arms race and has never implied that the strategic nuclear arms race should be stopped while the tactical nuclear arms race should be continued.

14. It has been stated here that the strategic arms limitation talks are the result of article VI of the non-proliferation Treaty; but it is difficult to accept the view, because the need for those talks was felt by the two main nuclear Powers quite independently of the non-proliferation Treaty. Also, while recognizing that the subject-matter of those talks is related to the test-ban issue, it is difficult to accept the view that, pending their successful conclusion, we in this Committee cannot make any progress relating to the comprehensive test ban or other measures in the field of nuclear disarmament. The General Assembly at its twenty-fourth session was fully aware of the commencement of the United States-Soviet bilateral talks; and indeed it adopted resolution 2602 A (XXIV) pertaining to them, at the same time

(Mr. Husain, India)

as it adopted resolution 2604 B (XXIV) asking this Committee to deal with the question of a comprehensive test ban as a matter of urgency and to submit a special report to the next session of the General Assembly.

15. At the last session of our Committee we devoted, on the initiative of the Canadian delegation (ENDC/244), considerable time and thought to the consideration of the question of a world-wide exchange of seismological data to facilitate the achievement of a comprehensive test ban. Those efforts resulted in General Assembly resolution 2604 A (XXIV), which has asked the Secretary-General to make certain enquiries and to transmit the result of those enquiries to this Committee. The Government of India has offered its fullest co-operation in terms of the statement of the Indian delegation contained in document ENDC/261 of 14 August 1969. We shall eagerly await the report of the Secretary-General before expressing our further views on this matter.

16. Resolution 2604 B (XXIV), for which the initiative was taken by the Swedish delegation, requires this Committee "to continue, as a matter of urgency, its deliberations on a treaty banning underground nuclear weapon tests", and "to submit a special report to the Assembly on the results of its deliberations". Unless some new proposals are made here we shall need to take up urgently the Swedish draft treaty (ENDC/242) placed before us last year and to discuss substantively the issue of verification and control, continuing differences over which between the two main nuclear-weapon Powers have been holding up progress for so many years. It has already been mentioned that, since the average number of nuclear-weapon tests has increased since the partial test-ban Treaty (ENDC/100/Rev.1) was concluded, it is a matter of urgency to put an end to such tests.

17. Connected with the question of the comprehensive test ban is that of the utilization by all States of the technology of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes. My delegation agrees with the view expressed by the Swedish delegation on 18 February that our Committee should take up the question of --

> "...an independent international instrument which would contain the rules for a non-discriminatory access by all States to the technology of nuclear explosions and a regulation of the utilization by any State of such nuclear explosions." (CCD/PV.450, para.45)

(Mr. Husain, India)

18. Regarding chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons, we need not dwell on matters which have already been under discussion for several years and on which we are all agreed, namely (i) strict observance by all States of the principles and objectives of the Geneva Protocol (A/7575/Rev.1, Annex VI); (ii) the need for all States which have not done so to accede to or ratify the Geneva Protocol without delay, preferably in 1970 in commemoration of the forty-fifth anniversary of the signing of the Protocol and the twenty-fifth anniversary of the United Nations; and (iii) that in the consideration of further steps nothing should be done which might in any way diminish or detract from the continuing validity and importance of the Geneva Protocol.

19. Regarding the recommendation of the Secretary-General (ibid., p.xii) that the General Assembly should make a clear affirmation that the prohibition contained in the Geneva Protocol applies to the use in war of all chemical, bacteriological and biological agents (including tear gas and other harassing agents) which now exist or which may be developed in the future, about which the views of the Indian delegation were expressed in some detail at our meeting on 19 August 1969 (ENDC/PV.429, paras.11 et seq.), it is a matter of deep satisfaction that the General Assembly has in its resolution 2603 A (XXIV), which was adopted with only three dissenting votes -- only two of which were those of parties to the Protocol -- reaffirmed the comprehensive nature of the Geneva Protocol. In the First Committee the Indian delegation expressed the view that --

> "... it is neither possible nor desirable that to meet the military doctrine or military requirements of any State, whether it is or is not a party to the Protocol, any exception should be made to the comprehensive prohibition of all chemical agents envisaged under the Geneva Protocol and recognized rules of international law." (A/C.1/PV.1706, provisional, p.18)

20. I may add that no existing or prospective party to the Protocol can, with a view to excluding harassing or incapacitating chemical agents from the prohibition under the Protocol, legitimately make a distinction between lethal and non-lethal chemical agents. There is a grave risk in allowing the use in war of CS or any kind of gas, because of the danger of escalation leading to the use of other gases. It is simpler and more practical to observe the principle: "No gases". That principle

(Mr. Husain, India)

appears to have been well understood by the leaders of both sides in the Second World War, during which neither lethal nor the so-called non-lethal gases were employed though both sides had ample stocks of them. At the outbreak of the war both sides exchanged assurances that they would observe the Geneva Protocol of 1925. Those who entered the war later did the same.

21. It is erroneous, in our view, to think that the use of tear gas in warfare is intended to save lives and is therefore more humane than the use of conventional weapons. The degree of harmfulness to man, in any event a virtually undefinable term, is irrelevant. For one thing, there is the problem of the vast increase of dosage that inevitably occurs with any military use. In military operations there is no way of administering a certain chemical material at a given level to some persons without giving ten or a hundred times that level to others. Under conditions of military use there are no completely non-lethal or non-permanently-disabling chemical agents.

22. Taking into account their over-all effect, it is a myth that tear gas can be used in war to save lives. A good deal of tear gas was used in the First World War but not to save lives. Hitler's Germany produced, but did not use, a large quantity of tear gas munitions during the war, certainly not to save lives. It is hardly humane to put a soldier out of action with the use of CS and then kill him with some kind of conventional explosive. It would be impossible to control such use of tear gas on the battlefield. It may be possible theoretically to make a distinction between lethal and so-called non-lethal chemical agents; it would clearly be impossible to do so in war, because we have in warfare no enforcement mechanism.

23. Furthermore, in the past when lethal chemical agents were used extensively, the use of tear gas always preceded resort to lethal gases. When one uses certain chemical agents in combat or makes any other kind of exception to the Geneva Protocol, one is engaging in chemical warfare; and this would undoubtedly lead to retaliation in kind and therefore to more chemical warfare. Such a possibility could serve to stimulate military interest in warfare in many countries, leading to more and more sophistication and development, and result in a build-up of a more varied chemical capability around the world. In this building-up of chemical capability it would become impossible to maintain the finer distinction between the various degrees of lethality of chemical agents. It would be unfortunate if the application of the existing and future knowledge of biochemistry to military purposes should open up a new dimension of warfare that otherwise might remain closed.

(Mr. Husain, India)

24. It is the view of my delegation that, as the Geneva Protocol has firmly closed the door against the use of all chemical and biological agents without exception, our Committee should now concern itself only with the requirements of General Assembly resolution 2603 B (XXIV) and endeavour to reach agreement in order to halt the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical and bacteriological (biological) agents for purposes of war and to achieve their effective elimination from the arsenals of nations. Before we examine the draft convention submitted by the socialist countries in New York (A/7655) or the draft convention submitted last year by the United Kingdom delegation (ENDC/255/Rev.1) to this Committee, particularly in view of the divergent views expressed by the Soviet Union and the United States, we need to clarify at this stage whether the draft convention or conventions we propose to elaborate should deal only with bacteriological (biological) weapons or with bacteriological (biological) and chemical weapons separately or with bacteriological (biological) and chemical weapons together.

25. On this issue the views of the Indian delegation were stated in clear terms at our meeting on 19 August 1969 (ENDC/PV.429, para.24) as well as in New York (A/C.1/PV.1706, provisional, p.22), so I will not take up the time of the Committee by repeating them. But I would like to say that we cannot accept the view that, because chemical weapons have on certain occasions been used in warfare and a number of countries have a chemical-warfare capability or are conducting research in this field, and of those countries some may wish to maintain chemical-weapons programmes to discourage the use against them of chemical warfare and to provide a retaliatory capability if deterrence fails -- so the argument runs --, we should confine our efforts to a ban on bacteriological (biological) weapons only.

26. It is not possible either for us to agree to separate treatment of bacteriological (biological) and chemical weapons on the ground that chemical weapons are for tactical use whereas bacteriological (biological) weapons are for strategic purposes; they are both weapons of mass destruction, and neither the Secretary-General's report (A/7575/Rev.1) nor the report of the World Health Organization[1/] makes any distinction.

1/ Health Aspects of Chemical and Biological Weapons, Report of a WHO Group of Consultants, Geneva, 1970.

(Mr. Husain, India)

27. Having concluded this statement of our views on chemical and biological weapons, I should now like to speak about the sea-bed draft treaty. In accordance with General Assembly resolution 2602 F (XXIV) we are required to take into account all the proposals and suggestions made at the twenty-fourth session of the General Assembly and to submit to its next session the text of a draft treaty on the prohibition of the emplacement of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction on the sea-bed and the ocean floor. The views of the Indian delegation regarding the joint draft CCD/269 submitted by the United States and the Soviet Union were expressed at our meeting on 21 October 1969 (CCD/PV.444, paras.39-52), and regarding the revised joint draft CCD/269/Rev.1 in the First Committee on 1 December 1969 (A/C.1/PV.1706, provisional, pp.23-30), so I will not reiterate these here. Suffice it to say at this stage that on the basis of working papers submitted in New York by the delegations of Sweden, Mexico, Canada, Brazil and Argentina, and any other suggestions that might be made here, negotiations should be undertaken to prepare a further revised draft for the consideration of this Committee before it is submitted to the next session of the General Assembly.

28. Mrs. MYRDAL (Sweden): Today I intend to deal with the subject which many delegations which have spoken so far have characterized as the most urgent one on our agenda, the question of chemical and biological weapons. This Committee is under a mandate from the General Assembly of the United Nations to try to reach agreement on further prohibitions in this field. The mandate is comprehensive:

> "... to submit a report on progress on all aspects of the problem of the elimination of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons to the General Assembly at its twenty-fifth session". (resolution 2603 B (XXIV))

29. Before turning to what is the main theme of my intervention, namely the possibility of further prohibitions on production, stockpiling, etc., of these weapons, I feel compelled to deal for a moment with the already-existing prohibition of the use of chemical and biological agents in international armed conflicts. The reason is the public statement made by the British Government

(Mrs. Myrdal, Sweden)

recently on their interpretation of the Geneva Protocol of 1925 (A/7575/Rev.1, Annex VI), a statement which was referred to at some length by the representative of the United Kingdom, Lord Chalfont, in his intervention on 19 February. At the end of this part of his statement Lord Chalfont said --

> "... that the Committee would be doing itself a disservice if it devoted time and attention to seeking to outlaw a substance like CS at the expense of concentrating on the whole range of lethal weapons of war in national arsenals." (CCD/PV.451, para.21).

30. This will of course not happen, as the use in war of CS -- which is a tear gas, whatever other names you attach to it -- is already prohibited under the generally-recognized rules of international law as embodied in the Geneva Protocol. The relevant factor in connexion with the prohibition of the use in war of a substance like CS is certainly not its physical appearance as smoke but its physiological effects on man. The tear gases are intended to affect an adversary directly, whereas smoke -- the use of which in warfare is not prohibited by international law -- is a substance intended mainly for hiding, that is for protecting oneself.

31. It is somewhat disconcerting, moreover, to hear the distinction "lethal" -- "non-lethal" being introduced again. The Geneva Protocol makes no such distinction; and solid reasons have been offered why all these means should be considered in one spectrum, reasons which we have heard reiterated today by the representative of India and which have been well known and valid since the 1920s. That the vast majority of parties to the Geneva Protocol interpret the existing legal situation as constituting a total ban on chemical and bacteriological warfare was made quite clear by the vote in the General Assembly on resolution 2603 A (XXIV) and the debate in the First Committee which preceded that vote. No party to the Geneva Protocol had then or earlier sought to change its scope. Existing reservations concern only its applicability to first use and to non-parties.

32. What has since happened is a change in the position of one party to the Protocol, the British Government, purporting to establish a unilateral reinterpretation of the scope of the existing prohibition. However, no formal reservation or proposal for an amendment to the Protocol has so far been made by the British or any other Government party to the Treaty; if it were, other parties would probably feel

(Mrs. Myrdal, Sweden)

compelled to react formally. The United Kingdom statement is most regrettable. It is particularly so since it comes from a Government which in the past as well as in the present has shown such positive interest in getting ahead with further arms-regulation measures in the field of biological and chemical warfare.

33. I will now turn to the main subject of this intervention: the further prohibitions -- on development, production, stockpiling, etc. -- that we should seek in connexion with chemical and biological weapons. When applying our energy and ingenuity to this task it is, I submit, useless to argue in an abstract way for or against simultaneous treatment of both chemical and biological means of warfare. This leads either to exercises like those of the theological hairsplitting in the Middle Ages, or to a strict division of supporters along traditional political lines.

34. The most sensible way to embark on our task to try to arrive at further prohibitory measures would seem to me to be, instead, first to analyse from a substantive point of view how far it is feasible to treat chemical and biological weapons together or to what extent it is necessary to give them separate treatment. From such an alalysis we shall be able to conclude, without any difference of opinion, whether we need to frame the prohibitions in one or two or more treaties, or whether we might perhaps have one over-all convention with separate treatment of some types of chemical and biological warfare agents in separate articles. We should, after such an analysis, be able to utilize to the utmost the constructive efforts which have already been made, as evidenced by the two available draft conventions, the British one (ENDC/255/Rev.1), and that put forward in the United Nations by nine socialist delegations (A/7655).

35. The former deals only with biological weapons, as we know. We must therefore examine if, and how, it could be applied to chemical weapons. It also seeks to include a prohibition against the use of bacteriological means of warfare, thus duplicating the Geneva Protocol -- an unnecessary and perhaps, because it is confined to biological weapons, even a risky undertaking. On the other hand, the draft submitted by the socialist delegations which, without taking up again the question of use, seeks to deal with chemical and biological weapons simultaneously is rather general. A number of technical problems involved will make their appearance when we study it further.

(Mrs. Myrdal, Sweden)

36. When attempting to compare chemical and biological weapons as to common or particular characteristics we must perforce look for such possible differences as may be of relevance in connexion with a future treaty. From a purely material point of view many agents that can be used for warfare purposes have, of course, specific qualities. We should concentrate, however, on those differences which are relevant in our efforts at seeking further comprehensive prohibitions, or which may give rise to different claims on the needs for verification. The underlying overall reason for this search for relevant distinctions is that any treaty language has to be made quite concrete and spell out clearly the obligations called for.

37. Although an agreement about further prohibitions may only have to refer, as the United Nations resolution does, to certain activities, such as acquisition, stockpiling and destruction of chemical and biological weapons, I intend to make a rapid survey of the longer series of activities, starting with research and including, for instance, transfers and testing, in order to try to pinpoint where similarities or dissimilarities of substances call for special considerations. This matter is a little complicated and I have asked for my statement to be circulated quite early so that the members of the Committee may follow it more easily.

38. In regard to research, there is one marked common feature which will persist for the future, namely that many of the agents which can be used as a base for chemical and biological weapons are among those which are and will continue to be the object of basic research for various peaceful purposes. Thus, in the case of biological agents, research will be needed for gaining ever more knowledge of the origin of the diseases they cause and the contagion risks, as well as for the development of protective devices, particularly vaccines. In regard to chemical agents there is the same kind of demand for knowledge for producing protective measures, but also -- in regard to certain categories -- for the development of positively useful drugs, insecticides, herbicides, etc.

39. However, we must seek to establish the points at which such perfectly legitimate research may deviate into development with the aim of constructing means of warfare. The scope of a research project would then have to be redefined and the laboratory facilities specialized if the aim were to construct weapons. If so intended, the laboratories would need special equipment such as chambers for studying aerosols and

(Mrs. Myrdal, Sweden)

safety devices for handling extremely toxic substances or highly infectious micro-organisms. From a technical point of view the difference between peaceful purposes and those connected with weapons manufacture should be quite clear. The scientific agencies responsible for research must obviously well know where the line goes, that is where research for peaceful purposes passes into research aiming at constructing warfare agents. It is also most interesting to observe the mounting concern among scientists and technical workers with the ethical problem they face in connexion with this latter type of chemical and biological research.

40. From a verification point of view it is necessary to state that, unless told that some laboratories were used for military purposes, one would be unlikely to be able to tell them apart from well-equipped laboratories for studying, for instance, air pollution, drugs or vaccines. While the research facilities themselves thus offer few and uncertain possibilities of monitoring from the outside the purposes they serve, whether peaceful uses or not, some pertinent information can now be culled from open scientific publications. To facilitate verification or to express it positively, to allay suspicions as to possible chemical and biological warfare research, great emphasis must be laid on open information. Where research is listed as "classified", particularly by a government agency or under a government contract, suspicion is easily aroused, of course. I think it can thus be said of research that work on chemical and biological agents shows the same general features. Research with regard to both these types of agents will most probably have to be exempted from prohibition as well as from obligatory verification.

41. But in regard to development work on weapons ready for application in war, the situation is somewhat different. Although much less is known, it is evident from the Secretary-General's report of last year on chemical and bacteriological (biological) means of warfare (A/7575/Rev.1) that comprehensive work has been performed in several countries to develop warfare agents and also devices for the dissemination of those agents. This work includes preparing instructions and manuals as well as performing regular training in handling chemical and biological weapons for warfare purposes. Such development work, as well as training, could be prohibited unconditionally. Again, although the forms of devices will vary in many ways, the prohibition of such development work may well be dealt with in one comprehensive treaty. Only with regard

(Mrs. Myrdal, Sweden)

to the verification aspect may such differences exist as would call for separate treatment. That question is closely related to the aspect of production of chemical and biological agents, to which I will return shortly.

42. Testing is another activity which has to be considered. Because of the secrecy and the dangerous nature of such trials, particularly when undertaken in respect of possible use in aerosol attacks, testing will have to take place in remote areas and at comparatively large testing sites containing a number of technical facilities and safety arrangements. It would seem to be possible to prohibit simultaneously the testing of chemical and biological warfare agents. For the purpose of verification some useful leads might be derived from surveillance of the site of and the security arrangements for testing areas; while in order to provide more conclusive evidence different techniques for various chemical and biological means of warfare might have to be foreseen.

43. Production of chemical and biological means of warfare is of course the main activity at which international prohibitions have to be directed. Here the problems become more complex. Chemical and biological agents cannot always be treated similarly. The relevant question is connected with the purpose of their production. In that respect a crucial difference makes itself felt in regard to certain agents production of which is possible for peaceful purposes as well as for warfare.

44. Biological agents obviously lend themselves practically wholesale to unconditional prohibition. Some exceptions will have to be made, however, as I have already mentioned under research, for quantities needed for further laboratory work and for developing protective substances, particularly vaccines.

45. Unconditional prohibition is also possible for a long series of chemical agents. Production of such chemical agents as nerve gases and toxins might be unconditionally prohibited and could therefore be coupled with biological agents in an international agreement. The road divides at a certain point, however. That is related to the fact that some specific chemical agents have a legitimate use in peaceful activities which would have to be recognized in any future convention. With that problem in mind we have to discuss the need for a separation into two categories of prohibition -- what I have called unconditional and conditional prohibitions.

(Mrs. Myrdal, Sweden)

46. To illustrate this situation it might be useful to discuss the herbicides. Different kinds of these substances are used extensively all over the world to increase the yield of crops. They are also used in big quantities in forestry and gardening and for aquatic weed control. The method of their application is a highly-developed technique which concerns the right choice of agent, of plants to be eliminated and of the proper time for action. Without these very discerningly performed applications of herbicides -- and also of pesticides -- the food situation in the world today would be even worse than it is. Another important civilian application is to free certain areas such as roadsides, tracts under power lines, railway lines and airports from unwanted vegetation. That sort of more indiscriminate use also has some military applications, such as freeing fortifications and military airfields of vegetation.

47. In order to establish boundary lines in an international treaty between such production of certain chemical agents as I have just mentioned and production for direct warfare purposes, one would probably have to resort to what I have called "conditional prohibition", or prohibition with partial restraints. Technically the problem might be dealt with either in one comprehensive treaty with specified exemptions or in a separate treaty or protocol, where the restraining conditions could then be spelt out in more detail.

48. Undoubtedly we have to foresee that it might be more difficult to get international agreement on which chemical agents to exempt than on the prohibition of biological agents in general and on the considerably larger series of lethal and otherwise potently toxic chemical agents. Luckily, we could at least to a certain extent probably be aided in our search for such a selective prohibition by the fact that in recent years some of the substances used, for instance, as herbicides and pesticides have actually been found to have such considerable negative side-effects, involving short- or long-term risks to the health of man, animal or useful vegetation, that they have been put under stringent regulations. Although such prohibitory regulations belong within the competence of national legislation and differ considerably from country to country, I believe we should be able internationally to strive gradually towards agreement that such agents as are generally excluded from civilian use could be automatically included in a treaty of unconditional international prohibition.

(Mrs. Myrdal, Sweden)

49. Distinguishing between unconditional and conditional prohibition means that for the chemical agents the coverage in a ban on production would have to be somewhat less extensive than in a ban on use. But, of course, "conditional prohibition" nevertheless has a connotation of prohibition. As to the verification aspect, I suggest as a point for further discussion that, while for all agents under "unconditional prohibition" the most effective means of verification which are generally acceptable should be sought, for those other cases of chemical agents it may suffice instead to prescribe a procedure of obligatory reporting to some international agency on their production, stockpiling and civilian use.

50. Finally, the production of the other parts of a weapons system, that is the means of dissemination of the agents, such as shells, bombs and sprayers, creates additional problems. Production of some components, and particularly vehicles used for the dissemination of chemical weapons, might be identical with, or anyway sufficiently similar to and hence integrated with, the production in general of conventional weapons. For biological weapons there will, however, probably be special arrangements, easier to identify. But by and large it is not so much the production of the elements of dissemination devices which becomes the crucial point; rather it is the weaponizing proper: that is, the process of combining the agents with their delivery vehicles.

51. That problem is in turn connected with that of storing. The larger bulk of the chemical agents would seem to require larger storing facilities. Chemical agents can, further, be loaded in advance into the different types of ammunition. Such storing may, however, be spread out geographically. Biological agents, which are comparatively sensitive micro-organisms, may not withstand storing under the same conditions as the chemical agents. Probably their production and their dissemination would have to be close in time to ensure full effectiveness. For storing during longer periods, freezing techniques may have to be used. Such storing would not be very conspicuous, as the amounts would be much smaller than in the case of for instance, chemical agents. The observability of storing is thus quite different for chemical and biological agents. This last conclusion also seems valid for the problems of transportation of the agents.

52. A special problem which will become highly pertinent in relation to an international treaty is that of trade, that is transfers between countries. A

(Mrs. Myrdal, Sweden)

rule of thumb would seem to be to follow similar conclusions to the ones which we have discussed in relation to research and production: that is, unconditional prohibitions would be valid for all biological agents of warfare and for an increasing number of chemical agents. In regard to verification, certain rules as to reporting to some international agency or agencies would seem to be warranted. This must relate to all agents which might be used as means of warfare.

53. The question of elimination of existing stocks through destruction or decontamination should also be dealt with. The technical problems raised are considerably different here as between chemical and biological weapons. Elimination of existing large stocks of chemical agents may require operations on an industrial scale. Not only the agents themselves but also the residual products require special handling. The method of sinking them into the sea or in the depths of the earth is becoming of grave concern from a safety point of view.

54. Biological agents are as a rule easier to dispose of. This is primarily so because there is no need to annihilate the substances; it suffices to destroy their biological structure. Heating and different kinds of chemical interaction may be sufficient.

55. The conclusion seems to follow that, while destruction or decontamination of chemical and biological weapons may be prescribed under a general prohibitory rule, the technically-separate types of treatment required seem to call for different modalities if the destruction is to be verified.

56. In the preliminary analysis I have just made I wanted to demonstrate that several problems are common to the two types of weapons but also that some differ. Although those that differ are mainly technical problems, they may influence the content of any attempted treaty, particularly the solution of the verification problems. In this context I should mention that I have not set out to deal directly with the issue of verification today; but it does make itself felt whatever aspect one wishes to treat in concreto. The subject of verification is discussed in great depth in Part IV of the SIPRI study on chemical and biological warfare which has recently been sent to delegations by that Institute.

57. My statement today should be interpreted as part of the mapping expedition that I suggested in my earlier intervention on 18 February (CCD/PV.450, para.53) as a working method for the Committee at this stage of our deliberations on the matter

(Mrs. Myrdal, Sweden)

of chemical and biological weapons. It should be understood that the tentative conclusions that I have been drawing as I have proceeded with the analysis of how to deal with chemical and biological agents respectively do not represent any firm position of my delegation in regard to the question whether our Committee should work out one comprehensive treaty, such as exists in regard to the prohibition of the use of chemical and biological warfare, or two or perhaps even several separate treaties on the wide complex of prohibiting also development, production, stockpiling, etc. in this field. It seems possible to deal with them together to a considerable extent, while in relation to the production of certain chemical agents treaty language would have to be considerably more specific.

58. One of our conclusions is firm, however — the main one — : that it is necessary for the Committee to take up the whole complex for simultaneous consideration leading to simultaneous solutions. It is the duty of our Committee to arrive at international agreements of the widest possible coverage in order to satisfy mankind's quest for safety in regard to these fearsome weapons of indiscriminate mass destruction.

59. The CHAIRMAN (Brazil): In my capacity as representative of Brazil, let me first of all express my gratitude to all speakers who have addressed kind words of welcome to me. For my part, I should like to be associated with the greetings addressed to the representatives of Poland, Romania, Japan, Mongolia and Morocco.

60. I do not intend to go beyond the stage of preliminary comments in this first statement on the tasks that are on our agenda for the present session of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament. We cannot fail to recognize that all our efforts have to be geared to the ultimate goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international control; nor can we ignore the feelings of the community of nations as expressed in the resolutions of the twenty-fourth session of the General Assembly (CCD/275).

61. Among those resolutions probably the most comprehensive is that which proclaimed the Disarmament Decade (resolution 2602 E (XXIV)). It is perfectly clear that neither the General Assembly nor this Committee ever started its consideration of this question on the assumption that there exist magic deadlines or rigid schedules.

(The Chairman, Brazil)

That decision means, however, that stress should be laid upon efforts to attain disarmament as a broad objective which should be pursued with priority and constant striving by Member States. It undoubtedly justifies the study requested of this Committee for submission to the twenty-fifth session of the General Assembly, which should contain suggestions, plans and guidelines for action. It should not be an attempt to seek a rhetorical formulation, which would end in frustration, nor the pursuit of too detailed schedules for the conclusion of concrete undertakings, which would be unrealistic. Indeed, it must mean a decision to rededicate ourselves to our task with greater clarity of programmes and directives. Without any intention of being the advocate of original or definitive suggestions, I believe that action should be pursued along some of the following lines with regard to the Decade.

62. First, some principles which form the guidelines for action in the field of disarmament could be complemented, while at the same time further directives could be elaborated with a view to adding precision to some fundamental concepts.

63. We also find useful the suggestion that has already been put forward here to promote the revision of the co-Chairmen's proposals for general and complete disarmament under effective international control (ENDC/2/Rev.1; ENDC/30 and Add.1-3 since they were presented in 1962.

64. A third category of action could well be the setting-up and actual carrying out of specific measures of nuclear disarmament, without prejudice to collateral measure with a view to bringing about practical results in the field of nuclear disarmament, which so far has been considered a priority matter only in theory and in words. Such results should be obtained, however, without harming the interests of non-nuclear-weapon countries and in such a way as to liberate resources for employment in programmes of economic and social development, especially in developing countries.

65. The Disarmament Decade implies of necessity a considerable effort, which goes beyond the competence of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament but has to be taken into account by this Committee and to be stimulated by it. I refer to the range of measures that can lead to the strengthening of international peace and security and to the economic development of the less-developed countries of the world.

(The Chairman, Brazil)

66. For all those reasons we think that this Committee should be ready to devote a substantial part of its time to seeking a flexible planning of its goals and to reiterating emphatically its objectives in the field of disarmament. This new programme should lead us beyond the stage of preserving unarmed regions from the emplacement of arms or of disarming unarmed countries.

67. In those circumstances the Brazilian Government has followed with sustained interest the evolution of the Soviet-American negotiations on strategic weapons which are due to continue soon in Vienna. It would be futile to stress the deep political significance of such talks; since in this very room several speakers have done so with great precision and eloquence. On the other hand, the General Assembly of the United Nations, by resolution 2602 A (XXIV), has expressed the hope that "early and positive results" may be arrived at, and has appealed to the Governments of the Soviet Union and the United States "to agree, as an urgent preliminary measure, on a moratorium on further testing and deployment of new offensive and defensive strategic nuclear-weapon systems."

68. As original co-sponsors of this resolution we wish to reiterate our hope that the parties to this bilateral dialogue will take this appeal into consideration. As members of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament we look forward to the promising results that might follow dynamic and fruitful interaction between the strategic arms limitation talks and the work undertaken here, especially in the field of nuclear disarmament. Finally, as members of the community of nations, we hope that in the forthcoming substantive stage the United States and the Soviet Union will be able to live up to the great expectations that now exist and that they will reach vitally important results both in the realm of arms limitation and control and in the field of actual disarmament.

69. I should not like to be misinterpreted as putting less emphasis than they deserve on the issues on which it seems most likely that the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament will make progress in the short run. We attach considerable importance to those issues. I wish to single out first the question of chemical and bacteriological (biological) warfare.

70. The content of resolution 2603 (XXIV), which was given some consideration by members of this Committee during its session last autumn, is an important step forward

(The Chairman, Brazil)

in this field, since it declares the proscription of the use of such weapons in international conflicts. In the same positive direction is the valuable unilateral decision of the Government of the United States to halt production and do away with stockpiles of biological weapons. We believe that this initiative augurs well for the prompt conclusion of an international instrument in this field.

71. We have before us several important documents which are being closely examined by my Government and by all members of this Committee and which could form the basis for reasonable agreement. I do not intend at this juncture to give an absolute and a priori opinion on the scope of the treaty or treaties to be arrived at. However, I want to make it clear that we favour an effort towards the attainment of the broadest scope that may be sought in the process of negotiation. We understand that at the present stage we shall be faced with greater complexities and more difficult questions, since we are now dealing with a ban on the production and stockpiling of those weapons. That is why two very delicate aspects have to be kept in mind: the necessity of setting up adequate control procedures, which need not, however, be too elaborate, and non-interference with peaceful research and production.

72. The underground nuclear-weapon test ban, despite being quite an old subject, is nevertheless a very important objective. We have co-operated in all earnestness to attain it and still are very much interested in it. We are also very keen to consider all suggestions that have been presented over the years in order to make at least some progress. We expect the information to be supplied by all Member States of the United Nations to the Secretary-General according to operative paragraph 2 of resolution 2604 A (XXIV), to give a clearer picture of a technically-efficient and politically-viable system of verification -- a possible system. We also hope to see above all the strengthening of the political will to make progress in this field.

73. As to the treaty for the prohibition of the emplacement of nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction on the sea-bed and the ocean floor, the Brazilian positions are well known. I do not intend to repeat them now. On this subject we took note with considerable interest of the declaration made by the representative of the United States of America that questions of the definition of the area in which the treaty would be applied and of the verification procedures "touch on concerns of

(The Chairman, Brazil)

importance to many countries" (CCD/PV.449, para.22), and of his promise that "During this session we shall give sympathetic consideration to suggestions for accommodating those concerns." (ibid.)

74. Note should also be taken of the declaration of the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics about proposals relating to the treaty. He said:

> "The Soviet delegation is carefully studying these proposals. We believe that in considering the draft treaty on the sea-bed the Committee should, in accordance with the appeal of the twenty-fourth session of the United Nations General Assembly contained in resolution 2602 F (XXIV),
>
> '... take into account all the proposals and suggestions that have been made at the present session of the General Assembly ...' "

(ibid., para.52)

75. With regard to parts C and D of resolution 2602 (XXIV), I feel that the Committee should probably study the best way of obtaining adequate technical and scientific information before starting any discussion on the implications of those questions.

76. I do not wish to let this opportunity pass without expressing, as the representative of Mexico has done (CCD/PV.453, para.36), appreciation of the decision taken by the British Government to ratify Additional Protocol II to the Treaty of Tlatelolco (ENDC/186, pp.32, 33). Brazil, which has already signed and ratified this Treaty, has always considered that its full implementation requires the indispensable reinforcement of the formal undertaking by the nuclear Powers to respect this area of military denuclearization. That is why we hail the initiative of the United Kingdom, and we reiterate our appeal to nuclear-weapon countries to follow its example, thereby contributing to the consolidation of that Treaty.

77. Finally, with regard to our working methods the Brazilian delegation has an open mind. We believe it would be relatively difficult to innovate substantially; but we will always be ready to co-operate in both formal and informal meetings of this Committee even if such meetings take place more often than in the past. Although we have not specifically in mind the idea of establishing working groups, we will be available for informal contacts with other interested delegations whenever such a procedure may help to expedite the work of the Committee. Probably more important, however, than such mechanism is the spirit that should govern our use of it -- a spirit of co-operation, of respect for the legitimate interests of every country, and of continuous search for balanced and effective solutions.

The Conference decided to issue the following communiqué:

"The Conference of the Committee on Disarmament today held its 457th plenary meeting in the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the chairmanship of H.E. Ambassador Ramiro E. Saraiva Guerreiro, representative of Brazil.

"Statements were made by the representatives of India, Sweden and Brazil.

"The following document was circulated: Statement of Secretary-General on Occasion of Entry into Force of Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, on 5 March 1970 (CCD/282).

"The next meeting of the Conference will be held on Tuesday, 17 March 1970, at 10.30 a.m."

78. The CHAIRMAN (Brazil): If the Committee will bear with me for a moment I will raise a point on which some colleagues have approached me. As the members of the Committee are aware, Easter occurs at the end of this month, and there is a feeling amongst many members that the Committee should not meet on either Thursday 26 or Tuesday 31 March. I do not know what is the feeling of the Committee, whether this is the appropriate time at which to raise this point, or if the Committee would prefer to leave a decision until next Tuesday. If there are no objections to the proposal that there should be no meetings of the Committee on 26 and 31 March, I will consider the proposal to be adopted.

It was so decided.

The meeting rose at 12.5 p.m.

CONFERENCE OF THE COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

CCD/PV.458
17 March 1970
ENGLISH

FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE FOUR HUNDRED AND FIFTY-EIGHTH MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Tuesday, 17 March 1970, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman: Mr. K. CHRISTOV (Bulgaria)

(Previous verbatim records in this series appeared under the symbols ENDC/PV.1-ENDC/PV.430).

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PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Argentina:	Mr. C. ORTIZ de ROZAS
	Mr. A.F. DUMONT
	Mr. V.E. BERASATEGUI
Brazil:	Mr. R.E. SARAIVA GUERREIRO
	Mr. P. CABRAL de MELLO
	Mr. L.F. PALMEIRA LAMPREIA
Bulgaria:	Mr. K. CHRISTOV
	Mr. T. PETROV
	Mr. D. STAMBOLIEV
	Mr. I. PEINIRDJIEV
Burma:	U MAUNG MAUNG GYI
Canada:	Mr. G. IGNATIEFF
	Mr. J.R. MORDEN
Czechoslovakia:	Mr. T. LAHODA
	Mr. J. STRUCKA
	Mr. J. CINGROS
Ethiopia:	Mr. A. ZELLEKE
Hungary:	Mr. I. KOMIVES
	Mr. I. SARKADI
India:	Mr. M.A. HUSAIN
	Mr. N. KRISHNAN
	Mr. K.P. JAIN
Italy:	Mr. R. CARACCIOLO
	Mr. F.L. OTTIERI
	Mr. R. BORSARELLI
	Mr. U. PESTALOZZA

Japan:	Mr. I. ABE
	Mr. S. YAMADA
	Mr. H. OTSUKA
	Mr. J. SAKAMOTO
Mexico:	Mr. M. TELLO
Mongolia:	Mr. M. DUGERSUREN
	Mr. D. ERDEMBILEG
	Mr. Z. ERENDO
Morocco:	Mr. M.A.A. KHATTABI
Netherlands:	Mr. H.F. ESCHAUZIER
	Mr. E. BOS
Nigeria:	Alhaji SULE KOLO
	Mr. C.O. HOLLIST
Pakistan:	Mr. K. AHMED
	Mr. S.A.D. BUKHARI
	Mr. T.O. HYDER
Poland:	Mr. K. ZYBYLSKI
	Mr. H. STEPOSZ
	Mr. R. WLAZLO
Romania:	Mr. I. DATCU
	Mr. O. IONESCO
	Mr. V. PARASCHIV
	Mr. C. GEORGESCO
Sweden:	Mr. A. EDELSTAM
	Mr. I. VIRGIN
	Mr. R. BOMAN

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:	Mr. A.A. ROSHCHIN
	Mr. V.V. SHOUSTOV
	Mr. L.A. MASTERKOV
	Mr. V.B. TOULINOV
United Arab Republic:	Mr. O. SIRRY
	Mr. E.S. EL REEDY
	Mr. Y. RIZK
	Mr. M. ISMAIL
United Kingdom:	Mr. I.F. PORTER
	Mr. J.T. MASEFIELD
United States of America:	Mr. J.F. LEONARD
	Mr. W. GIVAN
	Mr. R.L. McCORMACK
	Mr. W.A. SEARLE
Yugoslavia:	Mr. M. VUKOVIC
Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General:	Mr. W. EPSTEIN

1. The CHAIRMAN (Bulgaria) (interpretation from French): I declare open the 458th plenary meeting of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament.

2. Mr. AHMED (Pakistan): May I take this opportunity to extend a warm welcome to the representatives of Brazil, Japan, Mongolia, Morocco, Poland and Romania who have taken their seats for the first time in the Committee? We are also happy to see amongst us Mr. Epstein, the Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General.

3. On 18 February the Secretary-General of the United Nations, U Thant, addressed the Committee in person and thus initiated the Disarmament Decade declared by the General Assembly at its last session (resolution 2602 E (XXIV); CCD/275). The Secretary-General referred to the achievements in the field of disarmament during the 1960s which, he said, "constitute initial but very important steps towards disarmament" (CCD/PV.450, para.10). He also said that:

> "... the world was at a critical crossroads where there was a real danger of a fearful new upward spiral in the 'mad momentum' of the nuclear arms race. The issue still hangs in the balance" (ibid.).

4. I might recall here that at the Conference of the Non-Nuclear-Weapon States in 1968 the delegation of Pakistan expressed its hope for a meeting between the two main nuclear Powers to discuss ways and means of limiting the strategic nuclear arms race as a demonstration of their good faith and in accordance with the pledge given in article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (ENDC/226*). Last year, when the representatives of those two great Powers met at Helsinki, we warmly welcomed this step and expressed our sincere hope for its success. Mr. Roshchin, in his statement on 17 February, said: "Public opinion and the governments of many countries have welcomed the beginning of the Soviet-United States talks on curbing the strategic arms race." (CCD/PV.449, para.40). We agree with Mr. Smith's observation that "all nations have an important stake in the success of those talks" (ibid., para.19). In looking forward to the next session at Vienna in April we fully share the hope expressed by Mr. Smith in his statement on 17 February that "1970 can produce concrete progress in this urgent and vital matter" (ibid., para.21).

(Mr. Ahmed, Pakistan)

5. Some delegations have referred to the close link between the strategic arms limitation talks (SALT) and the work of this Committee. The Secretary-General also has observed that progress in these talks will undoubtedly have a most important bearing on all of the work of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD/PV.450, para.23). That brings me to the Secretary-General's reminder to us that serious attempts should be made to obtain the participation of all the nuclear Powers in all efforts for disarmament and that the active co-operation of all of them is essential for a full measure of success (ibid., para.24).

6. The Committee will recall that in its first statement on 7 August 1969 the Pakistan delegation expressed the earnest hope "that the two nuclear Powers France and China, which are not in our midst, will before long be enabled to participate in this forum" (ENDC/PV.426, para.21). I should like also to reiterate the observation made by the Pakistan delegation in the First Committee on 1 December 1969 that --

> "... the non-participation of France and the absence of the People's Republic of China -- both nuclear Powers -- from the negotiations on disarmament is still a serious impediment to the real success of those negotiations" (A/C.1/PV.1707, provisional, p.3).

7. At its last session the General Assembly adopted as many as twelve resolutions concerning items on disarmament. In this connexion the Committee has before it document CCD/275, which includes a letter dated 30 January from the Secretary-General. I have brief comments to make on some of the items before the Committee.

8. Regarding the question of a comprehensive test-ban treaty, to which the General Assembly has attached the greatest urgency, the Committee is aware that no progress was made last year. There is now an impasse, primarily because of the lack of political will on the part of the super-Powers. The question of verification and control has been the main obstacle to agreement; but it now appears that, as a result of the development of technology, there is a possibility that verification can be carried out without on-site inspection. Thanks to the efforts of the Canadian delegation, the General Assembly adopted resolution 2604 A (XXIV). We believe that the proposed exchange of seismic data will be a vital step in achieving significant progress towards agreement on a comprehensive test-ban treaty.

(Mr. Ahmed, Pakistan)

9. My delegation believes that it should be possible to reach agreement on a draft treaty on the prohibition of the emplacement of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction on the sea-bed and the ocean floor and in the subsoil thereof during the course of the present session. The views of the Pakistan delegation on the various aspects of such a treaty were expressed in this Committee on 23 October 1969 (CCD/PV.445, paras.27-34) and in the First Committee last December (A/C.1/PV.1707, provisional, pp.7-8). I do not wish to deal with the subject at this time. We hope to have an opportunity of doing so when the further revised draft text of the treaty is submitted to the Committee by the co-Chairmen.

10. The views of my delegation on the question of the use of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons were clearly stated in our statement of 4 September 1969 (CCD/PV.434, paras.58-69). We fully endorsed the three recommendations made by the Secretary-General in his foreword to report A/7575/Rev.1 (p.xii). We stated that we had no doubt in our minds that the Geneva Protocol (ibid., annex VI) prohibited the use in war of all chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons, including tear gas and other harassing agents, which now exist or which might be evolved in the future (CCD/PV.434, para.62). As we stated at that time, we should proceed from the point that the use of such weapons is already prohibited and that only the additional measures prohibiting their development, production and stockpiling remain to be undertaken (ibid., para.65).

11. The Committee now has before it General Assembly resolution 2603 B (XXIV). In operative paragraph 2 of section III of the resolution the General Assembly has requested the Committee on Disarmament to give urgent consideration to reaching agreement on the prohibitions and other measures referred to in the draft convention submitted by the nine socialist States on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons and on the destruction of such weapons (A/7655), and in the United Kingdom draft convention for the prohibition of biological methods of warfare (ENDC/255/Rev.1), as well as other relevant proposals. The Committee has been asked to submit a progress report on all aspects of the problem of elimination of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons to the General Assembly at its twenty-fifth session.

(Mr. Ahmed, Pakistan)

12. In the light of the observations which have so far been made in the Committee it is clear that there are divergent views on how the problem of the elimination of those weapons should be tackled. In the First Committee the Pakistan delegation made some observations on both the draft convention of the socialist countries and the United Kingdom draft convention (A/C.1/PV.1707, provisional, pp.11-12). We see merit in the socialist draft convention, as it deals with both types of weapons; but we feel that the measures to implement the prohibitions should be spelt out. We are glad to note that the Polish delegation intends to introduce a proposal on a safeguards clause to strengthen the main provisions of the document (CCD/PV.452, para

13. In this connexion I should like to mention that during the consideration of this subject in the First Committee the Pakistan delegation commended the Japanese proposa made last year, and restated by Mr. Abe in his statement on 10 March, that a group of competent scientists and technologists should study the technical problems relating to verification of the production and stockpiling of chemical and biological weapons (CCD/PV.456, para.81). An indication of the complexities of the problem before us was given in Mrs. Myrdal's statement of 12 March (CCD/PV.457, paras.40 et seq.). We feel that further discussions in the Committee would help in clarifying the position. My delegation will return to the subject at a later stage.

14. In resolution 2602 E (XXIV) the General Assembly has asked the Committee on Disarmament to work out a comprehensive programme dealing with all aspects of the problem of the cessation of the arms race and general and complete disarmament under effective international control and to report thereon to the twenty-fifth session.

15. The leader of the Pakistan delegation to the twenty-fourth General Assembly observed in his statement that the record of more than twenty years of disarmament negotiations could not be regarded as impressive. While certain treaties in the nature of non-armament measures, and most recently the Treaty on the Non-Proliferatio of Nuclear Weapons, had been concluded, there had been no agreement in the field of true disarmament. The goal of general and complete disarmament remained as distant as ever, and agreement even on collateral measures of disarmament was not in sight.

(Mr. Ahmed, Pakistan)

16. My delegation is aware of the incredibly complex nature of the decisions involved, but we remain convinced that, unless and until a serious attempt is made to tackle this problem now, we may find that the passage of time has created new obstacles to progress. As the Secretary-General and a number of delegations have pointed out, the elements of a programme of general and complete disarmament already exist. We believe that the Committee should consider this matter as early as possible.

17. Mr. ESCHAUZIER (Netherlands): In this statement I should like to dwell at some length on a topic to which this Conference, in accordance with the request of the General Assembly in its resolution 2603 B (XXIV) (CCD/275), should give urgent consideration with a view to reaching further agreement on the question of chemical and biological warfare.

18. The Netherlands delegation welcomes the fact that the question of chemical and bacteriological weapons is likely to receive high priority at this Conference during the present session. We are also satisfied that the General Assembly recognized the predominant importance of the Geneva Protocol of 1925 (A/7575/Rev.1, annex VI). All States which have not yet done so have been invited to accede to or ratify this Protocol in the course of this year in commemoration of the forty-fifth anniversary of its signing and the twenty-fifth anniversary of the United Nations.

19. In this connexion I should like to remind this Conference of the statement of Mr. Asakai at our meeting on 14 August 1969 that the Japanese Government is prepared to consider the ratification of the Geneva Protocol in case we find ourselves in the unfortunate situation that an agreement on the complete prohibition of both chemical and biological weapons cannot be concluded in the near future (ENDC/PV.428, para.49).

20. I am sure we all noted with great satisfaction the statement of President Nixon on 25 November 1969 that the United States Administration will submit to the Senate, for its advice and consent to ratification, the Geneva Protocol of 1925.

21. I should also like to refer to the other important decisions of the United States Government on chemical and biological weapons, namely renunciation of the first use of incapacitating chemicals; renunciation of the use of lethal biological agents and weapons and all other methods of biological warfare; restriction of United States

(Mr. Eschauzier, Netherlands)

biological research to defensive measures such as immunization and safety measures; disposal of existing stocks of bacteriological weapons; renunciation of preparations for the offensive use and of such use of toxins as a method of warfare; restriction of the United States military programme for toxins, whether produced by bacteriological or any other biological method or by chemical synthesis, to research for defensive purposes only.

22. This list comprises some important unilateral initiatives towards disarmament. The Netherlands delegation would particularly stress the decision to renounce the use -- not only first use but also retaliatory use -- of biological agents and weapons. In this respect the United States Government, which is not a party to the Geneva Protocol, has gone further than many of the original parties to the Protocol. As this Conference is aware, in acceding to the Protocol a substantial number of States made the reservation that the Protocol ceases to be binding on the acceding State in regard to all enemy States the armed forces or allies of which fail to respect the Protocol. That reservation was also made by the Netherlands Government when ratifying the Protocol in 1930; but the reservation was limited to the use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases. In doing this the Netherlands was among the first countries to renounce unconditionally the use of bacteriological or biological weapons. I therefore believe that the Netherlands has a certain right to issue an appeal to follow the example set by the United States Government. In this connexion we have noted with interest the proposals (CCD/PV.456, para.35) made by the delegation of Yugoslavia at our meeting on 10 March.

23. At this stage I should like to remind the Conference of the Italian initiative at the last session of the General Assembly according to which all parties to the Geneva Protocol were to be invited to consider the prohibition of "first use" contained therein as valid erga omnes (A/C.1/L.498). That initiative was not voted on, but we supported it (A/C.1/PV.1717, provisional, pp.8-10) and are still in favour of such a decision.

24. I agreed with Mr. Ortiz de Rozas when he stated at our meeting on 3 March that the Geneva Protocol has given proof of its great moral force, in spite of the limited number of Governments that have acceded to it (CCD/PV.454, para.14). I felt inclined to add: and also in spite of the fact that the Geneva Protocol gave rise to different interpretations as to its scope and coverage.

(Mr. Eschauzier, Netherlands)

25. We had and still have great difficulty in subscribing to resolution 2603 A (XXIV), which was adopted by eighty votes to three, with thirty-six abstentions, and which declares as contrary to the generally-recognized rules of international law, as embodied in the Geneva Protocol, the use in international armed conflict of any chemical and biological agents of warfare. We made that position clear in the First Committee on 10 December 1969. We admitted the existence of certain ambiguities in the Protocol. We also agreed that it is important to dispel, as soon as circumstances permit, any uncertainty which might continue to exist with regard to the scope of the Protocol. We therefore suggested that in due course the Protocol could best be supplemented by an additional agreement or agreements reflecting the realities of the present and anticipating future developments (A/C.1/PV.1717, provisional, pp.4-10).

26. I can now add to our position taken at that time that the Netherlands Minister of Foreign Affairs, in a parliamentary debate on 12 February, declared his willingness to co-operate in seeking agreement to abolish for the future the use of herbicides and defoliants in warfare. That important decision was based on the consideration that large-scale use of such chemical agents might have long-term effects of an unpredictable nature on man's environment. This question is related to the ecological problems which are confronting mankind and on which an important conference will be held under the auspices of the United Nations in 1972.

27. With regard to the use of tear gas in warfare, the Netherlands Government continues to have doubts. It is not so much the use of that weapon which has been criticized; it is rather the misuse. The cardinal question would appear to be whether or not it is deemed possible to restrain the use of certain specified harrassing agents by the proper legal and customary rules of war instead of banning them completely from military arsenals. In any event, a ban on the production of such agents would have to make allowance for the production of adequate quantities for riot-control purposes. My Government intends to reconsider the whole question after it has received a report to be submitted in the near future by our National Advisory Committee on Questions of Disarmament and International Peace and Security. That Committee was established a few years ago by the Minister of Foreign Affairs as an independent body composed mainly of qualified individuals outside the Government.

(Mr. Eschauzier, Netherlands)

28. We now have before us two draft conventions. The United Kingdom submitted a draft convention for the prohibition of biological methods of warfare (ENDC/255/Rev.1) to this Conference, whereas nine socialist countries submitted to the General Assembly a draft convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons and on the destruction of such weapons (A/7655). The two drafts adopt a different approach. The former deals only with biological weapons, while the latter is a comprehensive one, including both chemical and biological weapons.

29. Much has already been said in this Conference on the advantages and disadvantages of the two proposals. We can approach the problem either from an intellectual or from a pragmatic point of view. Intellectually, there are certain arguments in favour of a comprehensive solution. Mr. Roshchin mentioned several of them in his statement before this Conference on 3 March (CCD/PV.454). Counter-arguments can be formulated as well, the most powerful being that biological agents depend for their effects on their ability to multiply in the person, animal or plant attacked. We know that in the Secretary-General's report on chemical and biological weapons (A/7575/Rev.1, para.19) it is stated that what may be regarded today as a biological agent could tomorrow, as knowledge advances, be treated as chemical.

30. This judgement has been couched in very prudent terms. I want to underline the words "could", "tomorrow" and "as knowledge advances". Moreover, the following paragraphs of the report lead to the conclusion that for the foreseeable future there are basic differences in the characteristics of chemical and biological agents. Practical reasons could be added to this. Biological weapons have not yet been used so far in war. They are -- as far as we know -- not yet available on an operational basis. It is generally recognized that biological weapons are extremely dangerous and risky both to the attacked and to the attacker. It therefore seems evident that it is in the mutual interest of all States completely to ban those weapons. On this basis of mutual and interwoven interest it might conceivably be possible to reach a quick result.

31. From what I have just said it will be clear that the Netherlands Government has great sympathy for the United Kingdom draft convention and is willing to support its principal ideas. It is an example of practical wisdom in trying to achieve what seems to be nearest at hand. This does not exclude, however, the prospects for

(Mr. Eschauzier, Netherlands)

progress on chemical warfare and biological warfare being discussed together. Lord Chalfont stated to this Conference on 19 February (CCD/PV.451, para.18), that the United Kingdom delegation is ready to fall in with the wish of the majority, and that it is understood that the majority wishes a discussion on both types of weapons simultaneously. We can readily go along with this procedure.

32. Now with regard to the United Kingdom draft convention my delegation would like to make a few further preliminary remarks. Article I of the draft does not follow the definition of biological agents given in the Secretary-General's report on chemical and biological weapons. After an initial study of various possible formulations, we would prefer this article to correspond closely with the definition in the Secretary-General's report. We would therefore tentatively suggest that article I might read as follows:

> "Each of the Parties to the Convention undertakes never in any circumstances to make use for hostile purposes of living organisms, whatever their nature, or infective material derived from them, which are intended to cause disease or death in man, animals or plants, and which depend for their effects on their ability to multiply in the person, animal or plant attacked."

33. As a substitute for the traditional expression "use in war" (or warfare), article I of the United Kingdom draft convention offers the definition "for hostile purposes". For the sake of argument we have retained, as a possible alternative, that definition. It is less restrictive than the term "in international armed conflicts", which appears in resolution 2603 A (XXIV). It seems that there exists a certain parallel between the United Kingdom formula and the definition "armed conflicts in which armed forces are engaged in hostilities" in the Report on the Protection of Victims of Non-International Conflicts by the International Committee of the Red Cross (May, 1969).

34. Article II (a) (i) of the United Kingdom draft stipulates that each of the contracting parties undertakes not to produce or otherwise acquire, or assist in or permit the production or acquisition of, microbial or other biological agents of types and in quantities that have no independent justification for prophylactic or other peaceful purposes. We would prefer to delete the word "independent", because in our view it could lead to confusion and would lose its meaning in a supposed

(Mr. Eschauzier, Netherlands)

situation of threat by biological weapons. We also feel that the term "peaceful" may give rise to different interpretations. It is normally used in the sense of "non-military", but it has also been held to mean "non-aggressive", "non-offensive" or "non-armed". In the present context peaceful use would permit "passive defence".

35. We venture to suggest that the risk of any ambiguity could be eliminated by the following wording of article II (a) (i):

> "Each of the Parties to the Convention undertakes not to produce or otherwise acquire, or assist in or permit the production or acquisition of, biological agents of types and in quantities that are not exclusively required for prophylactic or protective purposes."

36. When Mr. Mulley tabled and introduced the draft convention on 10 July 1969 he pointed out to this Conference that verification, as that term is understood in disarmament negotiations, is simply not possible in the field of biological warfare (ENDC/PV.418, para.21). He gave two reasons: the agents which might be used for hostile purposes are generally indistinguishable from those which are needed for peaceful medical purposes, and militarily significant quantities of a biological warfare agent could be produced in a relatively small facility. We share the view that it is hardly possible to conceive a control system which does not contain loopholes. However, we want to reserve our position as to the question whether any control possibility has to be excluded once and for all. One could for instance think of introducing a system of inspection of declared facilities.

37. In this light we see merit also in the proposal which was first made by Mr. Asakai in our meeting of 14 August 1969 (ENDC/PV.428, para.47) and reiterated by Mr. Abe during the present session on 10 March (CCD/PV.456, para.81) that the study of the technical problems related to the verification of the production and stockpiling of chemical and biological weapons be entrusted to a group of competent scientists and technologists. We also fully agree with the representative of Japan that, in order to obtain conclusive evidence, any complaint procedure followed by an investigation requires speedy action. Mr. Abe pointed out that the Secretary-General of the United Nations should be able to "act without delay on previously arranged preparations for implementing such investigations" (ibid., para.79).

(Mr. Eschauzier, Netherlands)

38. Those considerations sound very familiar to my delegation. As long ago as 1962 the Netherlands Government launched an initiative in the General Assembly with a view to improving methods of "international fact-finding" and devising international machinery to that effect. Those efforts were pursued during subsequent years and resulted in the adoption by the General Assembly on 18 December 1967 of resolution 2329 (XXII), operative paragraph 4 of which reads as follows:

> "Requests the Secretary-General to prepare a register of experts in legal and other fields, whose services the States parties to a dispute may use by agreement for fact-finding in relation to the dispute, and requests Member States to nominate up to five of their nationals to be included in such a register."

39. It is not difficult to transpose this general recommendation in terms of the specific requirements of the problem I am dealing with now. The suggestion of the representative of Japan, Mr. Abe, to establish a roster of experts with a view to conducting investigations (CCD/PV.456, para.82) is therefore warmly supported by my delegation. However, I should like to stress once more that in the opinion of my delegation the possibility of devising some sort of a system of inspection should not be ruled out a priori but, on the contrary, should be thoroughly examined.

40. I come now to the socialist draft convention as presented to the General Assembly on 19 September 1969. Our main objection is that this draft convention deals with both biological and chemical weapons without providing for an adequate safeguards system. We cannot argue that the industrial and technological capability of the majority of nations is still not advanced enough to produce the horrible weapons we are discussing. I would like to remind the Conference of that part of the report of the Secretary-General on chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons and the effects of their possible use which reads:

> "Despite the fact that the development and acquisition of a sophisticated armoury of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons systems would prove very costly in resources, and would be dependent on a sound industrial base and a body of well-trained scientists, any developing country could in fact acquire, in one way or another, a limited capability in this type of

(Mr. Eschauzier, Netherlands)

warfare -- either a rudimentary capability which it developed itself, or a more sophisticated one which it acquired from another country. Hence, the danger of the proliferation of this class of weapons applies as much to developing as it does to developed countries." (A/7575/Rev.1, para.345)

41. We listened with great attention and interest to our Polish colleague when he stated on 24 February (CCD/PV.452, para.18) that a group of Polish experts has prepared a proposal dealing with the problem of an adequate safeguards clause and that it will be introduced in this Conference after consultation with the other sponsors of the draft convention. In view of that promise we will reserve our position on this point until later.

42. Article 4 of the socialist draft stipulates that:

"Each State Party to the Convention shall be internationally responsible for compliance with its provisions by legal and physical persons exercising their activities in its territory, and also by its legal and physical persons outside its territory." (A/7655)

We do not see clearly how a State can be held responsible for acts committed by unauthorized individuals outside its territorial limits. Responsibility is correlated to authority and influence, and a State's authority is confined to the territory within which it exercises sovereign rights. I would be grateful, therefore, to receive some clarification on this point.

43. We further believe that the language of article 1, containing the principal obligation, is not detailed enough. The socialist draft is limited to the prohibition of the development and production of chemical and biological weapons. Does this imply that all development and production of chemical and biological agents would be permitted as long as they were not included in operational weapons? This brings us to the very difficult problem of defining when an agent becomes a weapon. We therefore prefer formulas that make agents and not weapons the subject of prohibition, as exemplified in the United Kingdom draft convention to which I have just referred. That system constitutes a better guarantee that all options to retain a capability in this field will be given up.

44. I would like to assure those colleagues who have spoken before me on the same subject that my delegation listened to their remarks with great attention.

(Mr. Eschauzier, Netherlands)

My delegation is particularly grateful for the comprehensive statement — truly a "mapping expedition" — by the representative of Sweden, Mrs. Alva Myrdal (CCD/PV.457). We are also studying carefully the most valuable documentation on chemical and biological warfare prepared by SIPRI.

45. There is already a wealth of material before this Conference which can serve as a basis for a discussion in depth. My delegation expresses the hope that by the end of the present session this Conference will be able to report to the General Assembly substantial progress in fulfilling the mandate it was given in resolution 2603 B (XXIV).

46. Mr. LEONARD (United States of America): The United States attaches great importance to the achievement of reliable international agreements to control the development, production and stockpiling of chemical and biological weapons. The emphasis that other members of this Committee have given to this subject in their opening statements is a welcome indication that the time has come to take concrete steps to eliminate these weapons. But in order to take such steps, we must make a choice regarding the approach most likely to achieve results. We have before us two draft conventions (A/7655, ENDC/255/Rev.1). A number of constructive suggestions have also been made during our discussions. We can, of course, continue for an extended period to discuss these proposals in general terms. The United States delegation hopes, however, that the Committee will soon come to agree upon a course of action offering the prospect of early concrete achievement.

47. The value of this Committee is measured to a great extent by its ability to negotiate realistic and widely-acceptable agreements. The United States believes that such an agreement can be achieved in the near future through negotiation of a measure that prohibits the development, production, stockpiling or any acquisition of biological means of warfare. We also believe, for reasons that I shall give in some detail today, that it does not seem feasible at present to negotiate a single agreement prohibiting both chemical and biological weapons. I wish to emphasize, however, that the United States is committed to achieving effective controls on chemical weapons as well as on biological weapons. We think that progress can be made in the chemical field and are determined to contribute to that task. But we feel that to insist on a single agreement covering both chemical and biological weapons would be, in effect, to resign ourselves to no concrete advance for a considerable period of time.

(Mr. Leonard, United States)

48. I should like to comment first on the reasons why an agreement on biological weapons would be worth while. My Government recently completed an exhaustive review of its policy alternatives in this field, and I should like to share some of our conclusions with the Committee.

49. It is evident that knowledge of the life sciences -- biology and related disciplines -- has advanced dramatically in recent years. Progress in fields such as genetics and molecular biology will enable us to improve the health and well-being of people everywhere. Without effective political and legal restraints, however, these advances in knowledge could be put to perverse ends, resulting in ever more efficient and ever more horrible methods of using disease as a weapon of warfare.

50. Let us consider the destructive potential of biological warfare as it is already, at the present stage of technology. In the Secretary-General's Report on Chemical and Bacteriological (Biological) Weapons there is a table which compares the disabling effects on an unprotected population of hypothetical attacks using chemical, nuclear, and biological weapons (A/7575/Rev.1, p.44). In each instance an estimate was made of the damage which would be caused by the weapon-load of a single strategic bomber. In the case of chemical weapons, the area affected was estimated to be "up to 60 km^2". In the case of nuclear weapons, the area was estimated at "up to 300 km^2". But in the case of biological weapons it was estimated at "up to 100,000 km^2". In fact it has been estimated that, in terms of the amount needed to cause injury, infectious microbes can be a million times more poisonous than modern nerve agents.

51. Thus biological weapons present a clear danger to mankind, especially to an unprotected civilian population. The effect of their use, however, would be difficult to predict. The aerosolized form of a disease -- the form in which a biological agent can best be "weaponized" and disseminated -- obviously cannot be field-tested on human populations. Partly because so far we have been spared the use of these weapons in warfare, their effects can only be estimated from experience with natural epidemics and laboratory experiments. Thus there can be no assurance that this form of warfare, if ever begun, would not spread uncontrollably to one's own population and to still other countries, as well as to the enemy.

(Mr. Leonard, United States)

People living in areas of malnutrition, crowding and poor health facilities would be especially vulnerable to a biological attack. Because of the unpredictable and potentially uncontrollable consequences of biological weapons, their use could even produce global epidemics and impair the health of future generations.

52. Are there reasons of national security which require States to develop and possess biological weapons? Most States have already pledged themselves not to initiate the use of these weapons. The development of a biological warfare capability therefore should depend upon whether these weapons have value as a deterrent against use by others and as a means of retaliation -- of redressing the military balance -- if deterrence should fail. An assessment of their deterrent and retaliatory value is also important in giving consideration to methods of ensuring compliance with a ban on their possession.

53. It is the considered judgement of the United States Government that retaliation in kind would not be the best military response to a biological attack. In fact, we judge that it would not be an acceptable or rational response to a biological attack. A country subjected to attack with biological weapons might not be aware for days or weeks that the attack had taken place. If it concluded that it was the victim of a deliberate attack rather than a natural epidemic it would have to determine the source of the attack.

54. In deciding on what action to take, the attacked country would then have to consider the unpredictable nature of biological weapons and the incubation period required before they can take effect. Few, if any, military situations can be imagined in which a State would try to redress a military imbalance by retaliating with weapons whose effects would not show up for days. Furthermore, biological weapons could not destroy the military arsenal -- the tanks, planes, and artillery -- of an enemy, and the side that had initiated biological warfare would presumably have taken steps to protect its military forces, which would suffer far fewer casualties than would the civilian populations of both sides. Those, very briefly, are the reasons why biological weapons are not a necessary or even a useful counter to or insurance policy against the possible possession of biological weapons by some other State.

(Mr. Leonard, United States)

55. In the face of the grave risks in using biological weapons and of their doubtful retaliatory value, the justification for possessing them seems to reduce itself to the fear that one's adversary might possess them as well. Realizing this fact, and in an effort to reduce international tension, the United States has totally renounced biological warfare. We hope that more States will take similar action. We welcome the recent suggestions of the Yugoslav delegation for parallel action by other States (CCD/PV.456, para.35); but we strongly urge that such unilateral decisions be converted into a binding international commitment by the negotiation of a convention along the lines of the draft submitted by the United Kingdom.

56. The prospects for eliminating biological warfare through such a convention seem to us especially promising, and the advantages to the world community of a binding commitment seem obvious. The United States is not, after all, the only country with the capability of developing biological weapons. The unilateral commitment of the United States not to produce or stockpile biological weapons is not, of course, the same as an international act in which a large number of countries, including many with present or potential capabilities in this field, would join in outlawing the production and stockpiling of those weapons. The positive effect of a widely-supported international agreement would be substantial, and we should seize this opportunity to reinforce the already-existing agreements in this field.

57. In giving its support to the United Kingdom's draft convention the United States wishes to note its endorsement of article V. By its terms each party would undertake "to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures to strengthen the existing constraints on chemical methods of warfare" (ENDC/255/Rev.1). In many important respects, however, the problems surrounding chemical warfare are different from the problems of biological warfare and thus require separate treatment. Mrs. Myrdal last week pointed to some of these differences (CCD/PV.457, paras.24-26), and I should like, if I may, to carry forward today the examination of one or two of the important problems involved in devising appropriate controls in the chemical weapons field.

58. Chemical weapons are primarily battlefield weapons. The enormous logistical burdens involved in their massive use would prevent their employment over the vast areas which could be attacked with biological weapons. Chemicals are more predictable and controllable than biological weapons. Unlike biological weapons,

(Mr. Leonard, United States)

chemical weapons can produce immediate effects — an important quality for use in combat. For those reasons, chemical weapons have obvious usefulness in certain military situations. Their military utility was demonstrated in the First World War when 100,000 military personnel on both sides were killed by poison gas and 1.2 million additional casualties were reported. Today many States are capable of producing modern nerve agents which are both more toxic and more adaptable to a variety of battlefield uses than are the First World War gases.

59. At the present time some States believe that a chemical warfare capability is important for their national security. States maintain chemical warfare programmes and stockpiles to deter others from using these weapons and to provide a retaliatory capability if deterrence were to fail. Unlike the case with biological weapons, whose very doubtful retaliatory value we have already discussed, the inability of an attacked nation to retaliate with chemicals could give a significant military advantage to any government which might decide to violate the prohibition on the use of chemical weapons. If only one side were using chemical weapons, the mobility and fighting capacity of the other side would be greatly restricted in the entire area of combat by the need for protective clothing and other defensive measures, while the attacker would not be thus hampered in the areas he desires to leave free of contamination. As the Secretary-General's report states:

> "It is thus highly probable that once one of two well-equipped sides had been attacked with chemical weapons, it would retaliate in kind, in order to force its opponent to suffer the same penalties of restriction."
> (A/7575/Rev.1, para.37)

60. Given that situation, there is a reluctance based on sound military considerations to eliminate chemical capabilities without firm assurance and safeguards that other States are doing likewise. Progress in eliminating chemical weapons therefore depends upon developing reliable and negotiable verification arrangements. The United States is prepared to give further careful study to this problem.

61. It is our preliminary impression that, although verification problems are very difficult, they are not necessarily insoluble. A ban on production and possession of chemical weapons clearly could not be verified by national means alone, but the United States believes that substantial progress can be made in resolving the technical problems involved in verification by monitoring and inspection techniques. The United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency has been studying the verification problem for several years, and we are encouraged by our studies of

(Mr. Leonard, United States)

monitoring and inspection techniques. Should the Committee decide to undertake an intensive study of the chemical verification problem, the United States would make available experts in this field and appropriate research findings.

62. Because we believe that a ban on the production and possession of chemical weapons should be approached through a detailed examination of specific problems, I am today offering a working paper on one aspect of this subject (CCD/283), which was distributed this morning. You will note that it is concerned with the complex relationship between chemical weapons and peaceful chemical production. The working paper draws attention to the large number of industrial and commercial chemicals which themselves can be used as weapons or which are the raw materials or intermediates for weapons, to the capabilities of many of the nations of the world to manufacture such chemicals, and thus to the magnitude and complexity of the problem of determining what we want to prohibit and how such prohibition might be verified.

63. The whole problem of the relationship between industrial chemicals and chemical weapons points, in fact, to one of the obvious weaknesses in any agreement in this field which does not define in very specific terms exactly what activities are being prohibited. It is not adequate to prohibit the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons without defining those terms. The term "chemical weapons" does not have a self-evident meaning. It immediately raises several questions, such as whether the production and stockpiling of chemical agents or their intermediates would be permitted so long as they were not "weaponized" -- that is, put into munitions. A related difficulty is that a tank of phosgene, for example, could be stored in a civilian warehouse for peaceful use but could easily be used as a weapon if necessary. Would identical tanks of phosgene be permitted in a civilian warehouse but prohibited in a military stockpile, and, if so, how could the diversion to military use be prevented?

64. Obviously the framing of both the appropriate prohibitions and the methods of verifying compliance with those prohibitions are difficult problems and will require considerable effort. My Government will provide additional working papers which will, I hope, contribute to an understanding of these problems and help the Committee to decide upon a reasoned course of action in attempting to resolve them. It is obvious to us that we cannot hope to eliminate chemical weapons unless we can agree on clear and unambiguous prohibitions and can have confidence that whatever bans are placed on such weapons are being observed. Difficult as the problem is,

(Mr. Leonard, United States)

we must not put aside the question of controlling chemical weapons. Instead, we should be prepared to devote a great deal of energy to the chemical problem.

65. I am, of course, aware that some members of the Committee may hesitate to support a biological warfare convention because they fear it could have the effect of sanctioning chemical warfare activities. That is simply not the case. There are existing constraints on the use of chemical weapons, notably the 1925 Geneva Protocol (A/7575/Rev.1, annex VI). Those constraints would not in any way be undermined by further progress in this field; in fact, quite the contrary. Furthermore, we are dealing in reality with two different weapons systems. They have very different military roles, and doing away with one could hardly be a stimulus to activity involving the other. Chemical weapons are not substitutes for biological weapons. For its part, the United States has no intention of abusing the period which is obviously going to be necessary for this Committee to study chemical arms-control measures. It is, in fact, already a matter of record that the United States is not now producing any lethal chemical weapons for stockpile.

66. If, in examining the chemical and biological arms control problems, we can agree to negotiate on the basis of the United Kingdom draft convention and simultaneously pursue a study of how to handle the problems involved in restricting the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons, then we should be able to register one great achievement and lay the groundwork for another. If we try to eliminate both weapons at once and in the same manner, I fear that we shall have accomplished nothing at the end of a prolonged discussion.

67. Let us seize the opportunity we have at this time by once and for all destroying the spectre of biological warfare. If it can be said of us, when the time comes to review the accomplishments of the Disarmament Decade, that we opened the Decade by putting an end to the development of disease as a weapon of warfare, then we shall have earned the gratitude of people everywhere. As President Nixon stated in renouncing biological warfare: "Mankind already carries in its own hands too many of the seeds of its own destruction." This Committee has the responsibility and an immediate opportunity to see to it that certain of those seeds will never be sown.

The Conference decided to issue the following communiqué:

"The Conference of the Committee on Disarmament today held its 458th plenary meeting in the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the chairmanship of H.E. Ambassador Kroum Christov, representative of Bulgaria.

"Statements were made by the representatives of Pakistan, the Netherlands and the United States of America.

"The delegation of the United States of America presented a working paper on chemical warfare agents and the commercial chemical industry (CCD/283).

"The next meeting of the Conference will be held on Thursday, 19 March 1970, at 10.30 a.m."

The meeting rose at 11.40 a.m.